Національна Асоціація Адвокатів УкраЇни - The anti-corruption vertical cannot «take care» of the Bar as an institution,

The National Agency on Corruption Prevention has submitted proposals for public discussion to the ‘Bar and Legal Aid’ section of the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030. In particular, they claim that there is a ‘lack of transparency,’ “ambiguity” of disciplinary offences, and an ‘overly narrow’ list of sanctions in the disciplinary procedure for advocates. ZiB asked Andrii Misiats, acting head of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar, to comment on these aspects.

— Andrii Petrovych, how do you assess the NACP's statements about ‘problems in the Bar,’ in particular regarding disciplinary proceedings?

— The most alarming thing in this story is the use of generalised phrases such as ‘no transparency,’ ‘vague offences,’ and ‘strict list of sanctions.’ This is presented as established facts. But where is the justification? Where is the analysis of the law, where are the statistics, where are the examples of decisions, where is at least a description of the methodology used to arrive at these conclusions? None of this is there. And so I perceive this as an unfounded accusation.

The second thing is that these are not the NACP's theses. The agency was used as a platform. This is a public event that formally concerns proposals to the section on the Bar and legal aid in the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030. But when it comes to the Bar, it is logical to hear from the Bar: bar self-government bodies, disciplinary chambers, practitioners who go through this procedure as complainants or representatives.

Instead, the key participants invited are representatives of a limited circle of grant-funded organisations that live by the logic of ‘reforms’ and are financed by foreign donors. And this is not about “bad” or ‘good’; it is about something else: these people are not part of the profession, but for some reason, their agenda has become the main one.

We have already seen how these same circles have been focused on ‘reforming’ the judiciary for years. The effectiveness of these processes is, to put it mildly, debatable, and society feels it. Now I see an attempt to transfer the same approach to the Bar: first, a picture of a ‘systemic problem’ is created, then a ‘solution’ is proposed, and then instruments of influence appear. The disciplinary procedure for advocates today is a self-governing mechanism of professional responsibility, but thanks to the reformers, it can become a convenient entry point for external control. And this is already a question of the independence of the institution.

— The topic of the Bar did not arise ‘yesterday’ for the agency. It has long been involved in this area due to the history of declarations by members of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar.

And there, the evolution of the agency's position is very telling: at the start, when the Bar sought clarification, the NACP recognised that the Bar is an independent institution of society, whose activities are not related to the performance of state or local self-government functions, and therefore state control through declarations looks like interference and must pass the test of constitutional guarantees.

Then there was a 180-degree turn: within the same regulatory framework, the agency switched to the opposite logic and began to promote the interpretation that members of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar and disciplinary chambers of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar are subject to declaration.

In practical terms, this means one simple thing: the NACP gains a tool for exerting constant influence over those who perform disciplinary functions in the Bar. Although by its nature, this function is self-governing, not state-run.

Therefore, my explanation is as follows: the NACP agreed to be a platform because it has a practical, rather than theoretical, interest. It is a convenient format for legitimising the desired agenda in a strategic state policy document.

So if there are specific complaints, let's be specific: the law, specific practices, specific decisions, specific shortcomings. When general labels are used instead, it is not a professional conversation.

— And yet, let's go through the labels, but in detail. What about the transparency of disciplinary proceedings?

— It is directly enshrined in the law and in the decisions of the Bar self-government bodies. The disciplinary procedure is not a “closed kitchen”. It is defined by law: from the verification of information and the initiation of proceedings to the consideration and adoption of a decision. Participants are guaranteed procedural rights: to give explanations, ask questions, submit evidence, file motions and challenges, and use legal services. Hearings are not held ‘in silence’: the date, time and place of the hearing are announced in advance both by letters to the participants and on the Internet.

The disciplinary proceedings themselves are also open. There is only one exception, and it is understandable: when an open hearing could lead to the disclosure of attorney-client privilege. This is not ‘opacity,’ but a basic guarantee for the client and for the right to defence. At the same time, the law requires that the hearing be recorded and provides for the obligation to announce the decision and deliver or send it to the parties within the established time limits.

In addition to the law, there is a procedure for considering complaints, approved by a decision of the Bar Council of Ukraine, which details procedural matters and standardises practice. Recently, tools have been added that increase transparency and predictability. For example, the commissions' websites now publish information about the subject of the complaint, the parties, the rapporteur, and the approximate time of consideration. The materials of disciplinary proceedings are compiled and made available to the parties via cloud storage as they are received, without any ‘surprises’ on the day of the hearing. The requirements for the protocol have been further strengthened to ensure that the recording of the process is substantive rather than formal.

Therefore, those who say ‘there is no transparency’ should specify what exactly is not working in which norm or practice. I can say that under the current rules and the law, the decisions of the BCU establish sufficiently clear guarantees of openness, access of the parties to information, and recording of the proceedings.

— There is no ‘grey area’ here where someone makes something up on the fly. A disciplinary offence is defined in the law, and it is clearly stated what exactly constitutes one: violation of the advocate's oath; violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Advocates; disclosure of attorney-client privilege or actions that led to its disclosure; failure to perform or improper performance of professional duties; failure to comply with the decisions of Bar self-government bodies; violation of other duties of an advocate provided for by law. In other words, the list of grounds in the law is formulated quite specifically.

At the same time, the law immediately puts in place safeguards to prevent disciplinary action from becoming a tool for punishment for the very fact of participation in the process: for example, a court decision in favour of a client, as well as the acquittal or closure of proceedings against a client, cannot be grounds for disciplinary liability. This is important because it removes the temptation to substitute a disciplinary offence with ‘dissatisfaction with the result.’

The rules of professional conduct for advocates serve as a detailed description of the professional standard of conduct. For example, they define a conflict of interest as not only one that has already arisen, but also one that has the potential to arise; they separately establish the principle of professional independence and the requirement of honesty, integrity and principle in the performance of professional duties.

The Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly establish the presumption of innocence of an advocate in disciplinary proceedings, prohibit drawing conclusions based on assumptions, and stipulate that the burden of proving the existence of a disciplinary offence lies with the complainant. In other words, a ‘misconduct’ does not arise automatically or arbitrarily — it must be proven in accordance with established criteria.

Of course, in practice, errors in the application of the rules are possible. But that is why there is a review mechanism: a decision in a disciplinary case can be appealed to the HQDCB or to a court. To prevent errors, the HQDCB prepares summaries of disciplinary practice, which are binding on regional commissions.

Apart from defining what constitutes misconduct, the law requires that the decision be reasoned and that the circumstances of the misconduct, its consequences, the advocate's personality and other factors be taken into account when choosing the type of penalty. The law also specifies exceptional cases for imposing penalties in the form of suspension or deprivation of the right to practise law.

— Disqualification from practising, suspension for one month to one year, and a warning — these are all possible penalties. The NACP believes that this is not enough.

— I would start with something simple: disciplinary liability in the legal profession is not about ‘the more punitive instruments, the better.’ It is a self-governing mechanism that should protect the standards of the profession and at the same time not become a means of pressure.

Indeed, the law today provides for the three types of disciplinary penalties that you mentioned. This is a sufficient set in terms of its logic: it covers milder influences, temporary restrictions, and extreme measures. The effectiveness of the disciplinary system is determined not by the arsenal of possible punishments, but by whether there is inevitability and whether there is a fair, motivated review.

And the law clearly defines which disciplinary offence requires a specific type of disciplinary penalty.

When people start saying ‘let's add more,’ they almost always mean fines. And here a key question immediately arises: who should pay this money? If it is the state, this is not consistent with the self-governing nature of the disciplinary function. If the funds go to the budget of the Bar self-government, you get another problem: commissions will begin to accuse you of having an interest in imposing financial penalties. Plus, there is another practical issue: even with the current mandatory payments in the Bar, we see that some colleagues fundamentally ignore them or argue about the transparency of spending. Fines are guaranteed to exacerbate this tension, not alleviate it.

There is another aspect that genuinely surprises me, especially coming from an anti-corruption body. The more options for punishment there are, the wider the scope for discretion and the more opportunities there are for informal ‘bargaining’ over which penalty to choose. In other words, you yourself are creating additional factors that encourage corruption.

— Is corruption possible in the Bar, and should the fight against it be handled by the anti-corruption vertical, in particular the NACP?

— Corruption as a phenomenon is possible anywhere where there is a human factor. The Bar is not ‘immune’ here. But this does not imply the main thing that they are trying to push: that the Bar should become the object of care of the anti-corruption vertical, and the NACP should take on the role of supervisor of the self-governing institution.

Therefore, two areas must be distinguished here: criminal and disciplinary. If someone gives or receives an unlawful benefit, this is a matter for law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor and the court. Criminal law and procedure apply there, there is evidence, there is a verdict. The NACP is not an ‘arbitrator’ here and is not a body that replaces the investigation or the court. However, the issue of the advocate's disciplinary responsibility is a matter for the profession and society.

And it is here that the law draws a fundamental line between the Bar and the state.

Article 5 of the Law ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’ clearly states that the Bar is independent of state authorities and local self-government bodies and their officials, and that the state should not ‘manage’ the Bar, but rather create appropriate conditions for its activities and ensure compliance with the guarantees of the practice of law. In other words, the basic model is not subordination or external supervision, but guarantees of independence. Therefore, the anti-corruption vertical cannot ‘take care’ of the Bar as an institution.

— Such initiatives are very reminiscent of the desire to return to the model that Ukraine already went through in the early 1990s. Under the 1992 law, the disciplinary chamber was not only made up of advocates: it also included judges and representatives of the judiciary and local councils. In other words, the state was built into the disciplinary system of the Bar at the structural level.

After 2012, the logic changed fundamentally: the Qualification and Disciplinary Commissions of the Bar became self-governing bodies, and since then all decisions have been made within the profession, without the participation of ministries or other external institutions.

I can understand why this issue has become more acute during the war. In times of war, the Bar often becomes ‘inconvenient’: it systematically raises questions about the limits of state intervention, guarantees of protection, procedural standards and fair procedure. An independent institution of protection is, in principle, inconvenient for any state. This is because the Bar was not created for the comfort of those in power — it was created for the human right to defence and to curb abuses. And it is precisely the state's ability to withstand this ‘inconvenience,’ to provide guarantees and to respect the independence of the Bar, that is one of the practical indicators of how democratic and law-abiding a state is.

Andrii Misiats

acting head of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar

	18:32 Mon 29.12.25
The anti-corruption vertical cannot «take care» of the Bar as an institution, - acting head of the HQDCB
Home quote «When it comes to the Bar, it makes sense to listen to advocates, not representatives of a limited circle of grant-funded organisations», - A. Misiats, acting head of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention has submitted proposals for public discussion to the ‘Bar and Legal Aid’ section of the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030. In particular, they claim that there is a ‘lack of transparency,’ “ambiguity” of disciplinary offences, and an ‘overly narrow’ list of sanctions in the disciplinary procedure for advocates. ZiB asked Andrii Misiats, acting head of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar, to comment on these aspects. NACP agreed to be a platform because it has a purely practical interest. *— Andrii Petrovych, how do you assess the NACP's statements about ‘problems in the Bar,’ in particular regarding disciplinary proceedings?* — The most alarming thing in this story is the use of generalised phrases such as ‘no transparency,’ ‘vague offences,’ and ‘strict list of sanctions.’ This is presented as established facts. But where is the justification? Where is the analysis of the law, where are the statistics, where are the examples of decisions, where is at least a description of the methodology used to arrive at these conclusions? None of this is there. And so I perceive this as an unfounded accusation. The second thing is that these are not the NACP's theses. The agency was used as a platform. This is a public event that formally concerns proposals to the section on the Bar and legal aid in the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030. But when it comes to the Bar, it is logical to hear from the Bar: bar self-government bodies, disciplinary chambers, practitioners who go through this procedure as complainants or representatives. Instead, the key participants invited are representatives of a limited circle of grant-funded organisations that live by the logic of ‘reforms’ and are financed by foreign donors. And this is not about “bad” or ‘good’; it is about something else: these people are not part of the profession, but for some reason, their agenda has become the main one. We have already seen how these same circles have been focused on ‘reforming’ the judiciary for years. The effectiveness of these processes is, to put it mildly, debatable, and society feels it. Now I see an attempt to transfer the same approach to the Bar: first, a picture of a ‘systemic problem’ is created, then a ‘solution’ is proposed, and then instruments of influence appear. The disciplinary procedure for advocates today is a self-governing mechanism of professional responsibility, but thanks to the reformers, it can become a convenient entry point for external control. And this is already a question of the independence of the institution. *—Why then did the NACP agree to become a platform for raising issues?* — The topic of the Bar did not arise ‘yesterday’ for the agency. It has long been involved in this area due to the history of declarations by members of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar. And there, the evolution of the agency's position is very telling: at the start, when the Bar sought clarification, the NACP recognised that the Bar is an independent institution of society, whose activities are not related to the performance of state or local self-government functions, and therefore state control through declarations looks like interference and must pass the test of constitutional guarantees. Then there was a 180-degree turn: within the same regulatory framework, the agency switched to the opposite logic and began to promote the interpretation that members of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar and disciplinary chambers of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar are subject to declaration. In practical terms, this means one simple thing: the NACP gains a tool for exerting constant influence over those who perform disciplinary functions in the Bar. Although by its nature, this function is self-governing, not state-run. Therefore, my explanation is as follows: the NACP agreed to be a platform because it has a practical, rather than theoretical, interest. It is a convenient format for legitimising the desired agenda in a strategic state policy document. So if there are specific complaints, let's be specific: the law, specific practices, specific decisions, specific shortcomings. When general labels are used instead, it is not a professional conversation. Disciplinary proceedings are not a “closed kitchen” *— And yet, let's go through the labels, but in detail. What about the transparency of disciplinary proceedings?* — It is directly enshrined in the law and in the decisions of the Bar self-government bodies. The disciplinary procedure is not a “closed kitchen”. It is defined by law: from the verification of information and the initiation of proceedings to the consideration and adoption of a decision. Participants are guaranteed procedural rights: to give explanations, ask questions, submit evidence, file motions and challenges, and use legal services. Hearings are not held ‘in silence’: the date, time and place of the hearing are announced in advance both by letters to the participants and on the Internet. The disciplinary proceedings themselves are also open. There is only one exception, and it is understandable: when an open hearing could lead to the disclosure of attorney-client privilege. This is not ‘opacity,’ but a basic guarantee for the client and for the right to defence. At the same time, the law requires that the hearing be recorded and provides for the obligation to announce the decision and deliver or send it to the parties within the established time limits. In addition to the law, there is a procedure for considering complaints, approved by a decision of the Bar Council of Ukraine, which details procedural matters and standardises practice. Recently, tools have been added that increase transparency and predictability. For example, the commissions' websites now publish information about the subject of the complaint, the parties, the rapporteur, and the approximate time of consideration. The materials of disciplinary proceedings are compiled and made available to the parties via cloud storage as they are received, without any ‘surprises’ on the day of the hearing. The requirements for the protocol have been further strengthened to ensure that the recording of the process is substantive rather than formal. Therefore, those who say ‘there is no transparency’ should specify what exactly is not working in which norm or practice. I can say that under the current rules and the law, the decisions of the BCU establish sufficiently clear guarantees of openness, access of the parties to information, and recording of the proceedings. *— How are disciplinary offences determined today?* — There is no ‘grey area’ here where someone makes something up on the fly. A disciplinary offence is defined in the law, and it is clearly stated what exactly constitutes one: violation of the advocate's oath; violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Advocates; disclosure of attorney-client privilege or actions that led to its disclosure; failure to perform or improper performance of professional duties; failure to comply with the decisions of Bar self-government bodies; violation of other duties of an advocate provided for by law. In other words, the list of grounds in the law is formulated quite specifically. At the same time, the law immediately puts in place safeguards to prevent disciplinary action from becoming a tool for punishment for the very fact of participation in the process: for example, a court decision in favour of a client, as well as the acquittal or closure of proceedings against a client, cannot be grounds for disciplinary liability. This is important because it removes the temptation to substitute a disciplinary offence with ‘dissatisfaction with the result.’ The rules of professional conduct for advocates serve as a detailed description of the professional standard of conduct. For example, they define a conflict of interest as not only one that has already arisen, but also one that has the potential to arise; they separately establish the principle of professional independence and the requirement of honesty, integrity and principle in the performance of professional duties. The Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly establish the presumption of innocence of an advocate in disciplinary proceedings, prohibit drawing conclusions based on assumptions, and stipulate that the burden of proving the existence of a disciplinary offence lies with the complainant. In other words, a ‘misconduct’ does not arise automatically or arbitrarily — it must be proven in accordance with established criteria. Of course, in practice, errors in the application of the rules are possible. But that is why there is a review mechanism: a decision in a disciplinary case can be appealed to the HQDCB or to a court. To prevent errors, the HQDCB prepares summaries of disciplinary practice, which are binding on regional commissions. Apart from defining what constitutes misconduct, the law requires that the decision be reasoned and that the circumstances of the misconduct, its consequences, the advocate's personality and other factors be taken into account when choosing the type of penalty. The law also specifies exceptional cases for imposing penalties in the form of suspension or deprivation of the right to practise law. The more options for punishment, the wider the scope for discretion *— Disqualification from practising, suspension for one month to one year, and a warning — these are all possible penalties. The NACP believes that this is not enough.* — I would start with something simple: disciplinary liability in the legal profession is not about ‘the more punitive instruments, the better.’ It is a self-governing mechanism that should protect the standards of the profession and at the same time not become a means of pressure. Indeed, the law today provides for the three types of disciplinary penalties that you mentioned. This is a sufficient set in terms of its logic: it covers milder influences, temporary restrictions, and extreme measures. The effectiveness of the disciplinary system is determined not by the arsenal of possible punishments, but by whether there is inevitability and whether there is a fair, motivated review. And the law clearly defines which disciplinary offence requires a specific type of disciplinary penalty. When people start saying ‘let's add more,’ they almost always mean fines. And here a key question immediately arises: who should pay this money? If it is the state, this is not consistent with the self-governing nature of the disciplinary function. If the funds go to the budget of the Bar self-government, you get another problem: commissions will begin to accuse you of having an interest in imposing financial penalties. Plus, there is another practical issue: even with the current mandatory payments in the Bar, we see that some colleagues fundamentally ignore them or argue about the transparency of spending. Fines are guaranteed to exacerbate this tension, not alleviate it. There is another aspect that genuinely surprises me, especially coming from an anti-corruption body. The more options for punishment there are, the wider the scope for discretion and the more opportunities there are for informal ‘bargaining’ over which penalty to choose. In other words, you yourself are creating additional factors that encourage corruption. *— Is corruption possible in the Bar, and should the fight against it be handled by the anti-corruption vertical, in particular the NACP?* — Corruption as a phenomenon is possible anywhere where there is a human factor. The Bar is not ‘immune’ here. But this does not imply the main thing that they are trying to push: that the Bar should become the object of care of the anti-corruption vertical, and the NACP should take on the role of supervisor of the self-governing institution. Therefore, two areas must be distinguished here: criminal and disciplinary. If someone gives or receives an unlawful benefit, this is a matter for law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor and the court. Criminal law and procedure apply there, there is evidence, there is a verdict. The NACP is not an ‘arbitrator’ here and is not a body that replaces the investigation or the court. However, the issue of the advocate's disciplinary responsibility is a matter for the profession and society. And it is here that the law draws a fundamental line between the Bar and the state. Article 5 of the Law ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’ clearly states that the Bar is independent of state authorities and local self-government bodies and their officials, and that the state should not ‘manage’ the Bar, but rather create appropriate conditions for its activities and ensure compliance with the guarantees of the practice of law. In other words, the basic model is not subordination or external supervision, but guarantees of independence. Therefore, the anti-corruption vertical cannot ‘take care’ of the Bar as an institution. *— What are the possible consequences of introducing ‘supervision’?* — Such initiatives are very reminiscent of the desire to return to the model that Ukraine already went through in the early 1990s. Under the 1992 law, the disciplinary chamber was not only made up of advocates: it also included judges and representatives of the judiciary and local councils. In other words, the state was built into the disciplinary system of the Bar at the structural level. After 2012, the logic changed fundamentally: the Qualification and Disciplinary Commissions of the Bar became self-governing bodies, and since then all decisions have been made within the profession, without the participation of ministries or other external institutions. I can understand why this issue has become more acute during the war. In times of war, the Bar often becomes ‘inconvenient’: it systematically raises questions about the limits of state intervention, guarantees of protection, procedural standards and fair procedure. An independent institution of protection is, in principle, inconvenient for any state. This is because the Bar was not created for the comfort of those in power — it was created for the human right to defence and to curb abuses. And it is precisely the state's ability to withstand this ‘inconvenience,’ to provide guarantees and to respect the independence of the Bar, that is one of the practical indicators of how democratic and law-abiding a state is. The interview was published in Law and Business. Автор публікації: Andrii Misiats Andrii Misiats acting head of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar
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The anti-corruption vertical cannot «take care» of the Bar as an institution, - acting head of the HQDCB

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