How the binding nature of local government decisions relates to the independence of advocates – a study

At first glance, the binding nature of decisions made by bar self-governing bodies may appear to conflict with the principle of advocate independence. However, such a conflict is merely illusory when one considers the legal nature of self-governing powers.

The conditions for this combination were substantiated by a member of the Committee for the protection of advocates’ rights and guarantees of legal practice of the UNBA Maksym Stryhun in his study «Theoretical and legal interpretation of the concept of «Principles of bar self-governance».

The study was presented on September 29, 2026, at the Law Faculty of Ivan Franko National University of Lviv during the All-Ukrainian scientific and practical conference dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the birth of Boris Tyshchyk, a distinguished professor at the university.

As the author explains, the binding nature of decisions is a necessary condition for the functioning of any system of self-governance. If a decision by a competent body lacks legally binding force for members of the professional community, self-governance will effectively become an advisory activity.

At the same time, he considers this binding nature in conjunction with the prohibition on interference in an advocate’s professional activities.

Binding force must apply to decisions adopted within the scope of the relevant body’s authority, in accordance with established procedures and the law.

And that is precisely why the principle of binding force must be interpreted systematically — in conjunction with the principle prohibiting interference in professional activities. The bar association has the right to regulate organizational, professional-ethical, qualification, and other matters within the scope of its authority, but it cannot dictate to an advocate the content of a legal position in a specific case, determine the strategy for defending a client, or otherwise interfere with the performance of specific professional activities.

It is precisely this distinction, according to M. Strygun’s conclusion, that makes it possible to reconcile the professional regulation of advocacy with the individual independence of advocates.

As part of the study, the advocate also examines the legal nature of professional self-governance, its role in ensuring the independence of the advocacy profession from the state, as well as the importance of electivity, transparency of activities, and accountability to the legal community.