Suspension of the right to practice law does not exempt one from complying with the CPE – court

An advocate does not lose his or her professional status due to the suspension of the right to practice law. His or her public statements continue to be associated with the professional community and, therefore, may be evaluated in terms of compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct and their impact on the reputation of advocacy.

This was the conclusion reached by the Eighth Administrative Court of Appeal in Case No. 260/6591/24, which upheld the appeals filed by the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar of Zakarpattia Oblast, according to the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar.

The basis for the disciplinary proceedings was complaints regarding public statements made by advocate K. on Facebook using profanity. Following the review, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Transcarpathian Regional Bar Association held the advocate disciplinarily liable and imposed a penalty in the form of a warning.

In appealing this decision to the Transcarpathian District Administrative Court, K. argued that his right to practice law had been suspended, he was performing military service, and he was not actually practicing law. Therefore, in his opinion, there were no grounds for disciplinary liability. The court of first instance granted the appeal.

However, the appellate court did not agree with these arguments. The court noted that, pursuant to Part 5 of Article 31 of the Law «On the advocacy and the practice of law», during the period in which the right to practice law is suspended, an advocate is not permitted to practice law. At the same time, the individual does not lose their status as an advocate.

The rules of legal ethics are binding not only on advocates who are actually practicing law but also on those lawyers whose right to practice law has been suspended in accordance with the procedure established by law.

Therefore, the suspension of the right does not exempt a person from the obligation to comply with the requirements of the Code of Professional Ethics for Advocates, in particular Articles 57 and 59 regarding an advocate’s conduct on the Internet.

In the court’s assessment, the advocate’s public statements continue to be associated with the legal community and affect the authority of the advocacy profession as a whole. Therefore, the use of profanity on social media may be considered a violation of the ethical standards of the legal profession.

The court also rejected the argument that K. had performed military service. The panel of judges noted that this circumstance does not negate an advocate’s obligation to adhere to generally accepted ethical norms and standards of conduct.

The court took into account that the advocate did not dispute the substance or circumstances of the disciplinary offense, did not refute authorship of the relevant public statements, and did not provide evidence to refute the conclusions of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Qualification and Disciplinary Bar Commission.

Under these circumstances, the Eighth Administrative Court of Appeal concluded (in its ruling dated June 16, 2026) that there were no grounds for overturning the decision to hold the advocate disciplinarily liable.